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1. Axiomatization of Physics : a New Approach
In 1900 Hilbert famously announced his list of 23 open problems for the coming century [6];
under the number 6 it included the following:
To treat by means of axioms, those physical sciences in which mathematics plays an
important part.
The passed 20th century did not bring us any convincing solution of this problem. Following
Schreiber [10] I would like nevertheless to point to two important developments, which may help
to find such a solution in the near future. The first is Topos theory and Lawvere’s idea of building
physical theories synthetically within a suitable topos [7]. The second is Higher Topos theory
and Homotopy Type theory (HoTT) emerged in late 2000-ies [11]. Schreiber upgrades Lawvere’s
axiomatic approach with the mathematical apparatus of HoTT and then uses this approach for
building a tentative axiomatic Quantum Field theory.
Without trying to judge Schreiber’s proposal in its more technical aspects I would like to
explain here my enthusiasm about this new axiomatic approach in physics from a historical and
epistemological standpoint.
Hilbert’s and Lawvere’s approaches to axiomatizing physics differ not only in their technical
means but also in their general conceptual constitution. Hilbert describes the task of axiomatization
as a “logical analysis of our intuitive capacities” (quoted after [1], p. 424 ) assuming that logical
rules are fixed in advance and grounded independently. Hilbert says he derives his approach to
axiomatization from Kant but in fact his approach is close to Logical Empiricism. Unlike Hilbert
and Logical Empiricists Lawvere derives his conception of logic from Hegel and uses Hegel’s dis-
tinction between the subjective and the objective versions of logic. While the subjective version
of logic reflects only some general features of the human thinking, the objective logic, by Hegel’s
word, “takes the place of the former metaphysics” ([5], 21:48), which is supposed to reflect certain
general features of the real world. Lawvere reconstructs Hegel’s notion of objective logic mathe-
matically in the form of internal logic of an appropriate topos, which may represent some aspect of
the physical universe. In this case the axiomatization of a given theory amounts to revealing a logi-
cal semantics in the content of this theory rather than sorting out this content with some ready-made
logical tools ([9], section 5.8).
In the next two Sections I expose a classical problem concerning identity of physical objects
treated by Frege and then show how the Lawvere-style logical analysis empowered by HoTT pro-
vides a new solution of this problem.
2. Identity according to Frege
In his classical paper “On Sense and Reference” [2] Frege asks: In which precise sense the
Morning Star (MS) and the Evening Star (ES) are said to be the same planet Venus? What particu-
larly puzzles Frege is the following. The identity MS = ES is an astronomical fact. By contrast, the
assertion of identities like MS = MS and MS = Morning Star is trivial: these identities have no em-
pirical content, do not depend on any astronomical theory but rather instantiate a universal logical
principle and (in the second case) a mere linguistic convention. How presumably the same notion
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of identity can be used in such different senses? In order to solve this puzzle Frege developed in
this paper his theory of sense and reference. Then he uses this theory for showing that assertions
MS = ES and MS = MS has the same reference (namely the truth-value “true”) but indeed different
senses.
Today’s reader of Frege is inclined to think of the Morning Star - Evening Star example after
the pattern of Theseus Ship and other similar logical puzzles about identity. However as Frege
himself remarks in the beginning of his paper he is talking here about a real scientific problem;
although at the time when Frege was writing his paper this problem did no longer concern the
planet Venus it did concern comets and asteroids. Taking this into consideration one may won-
der why Frege’s analysis lacks any discussion on observational methods used for identification of
astronomical sources but instead relies upon linguistic examples having nothing to do with astron-
omy. The answer is that according to Frege the concept of identity is unique and applies across
all possible contexts; Frege believes that this concept can and must be fixed in the pure logic prior
to and independently of any mathematical or scientific theory (see for example [3], p. 74a). In
this respect Frege’s and Hilbert’s general views on logic are similar even if they disagree about the
precise sense in which logic and mathematics are said to be formal [4].
3. Identity in HoTT and its physical interpretation
The syntactic core of HoTT is Constructive Type theory due to Martin-Löf (MLTT) [7]. Unlike
Frege Martin-Löf considers not one but two different identity concepts: the definitional identity
x = y : T ( where x,y are terms of the same type T ) and the propositional identity IdT (x,y) :
type; he assumes that the definitional identity implies the propositional one but not, generally, the
other way round. The distinction between the two identities can be perfectly illustrated by Frege’s
MS/ES example: unlike the definitional identity the propositional one admits (and epistemically
talking - always requires) a proof. While in Hilbert-style deductive systems proofs are construed
as metatheoretical objects (chains of formulas) in MLTT proofs are theoretical terms. Propositions
and, in particular, all identity propositions like IdT (x,y) in MLTT are construed as types; terms of
propositional types are proofs (aka witnesses) of these propositions.
Under the homotopical interpretation of MLTT types “turn into” (i.e., are modeled by) homo-
topy types, (i.e., by topological spaces identified up to their homotopy equivalence) while terms of
these types turn into points of the corresponding spaces. Under this interpretation type IdT (x,y) is
a space of continuous paths between points x,y belonging to the given space T . So the proof of
identity IdT (x,y) amounts to constructing a continuous path between these two points.
In HoTT the identity of Morning Star and Evening Star translates into the propositional iden-
tity IdC(MS,ES) where C is an appropriately delimited type of observed celestial objects. This
proposition says that two apparently different celestial objects are in fact the same. The crucial
evidence in favor of this identity statement is the continuous trajectory t of Venus, which connects
the two different appearances of the planet (Fig. 1). Even if t is a mathematically-laden theoretical
construction rather than a directly observable object, it’s existence can be checked empirically.
Classical kinematic principles imply that t, if it exists, is unique. In MLTT and HoTT this
property is known as the uniqueness of identity proofs (UIP). Higher-order identities in HoTT
discussed in the next Section provide a model of MLTT where UIP is false. Thus the mechanical
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interpretation of HoTT sketched above may also apply in the situation when a particle follows
multiple trajectories simultaneously like in the path integral formulation of Quantum Mechanics
(Fig.2).
Figure 1: Classical path
Figure 2: Quantum paths
Let me stress that in the above example HoTT is not just a piece of modern mathematics
successfully applied to an older astronomical theory. It is a piece of modern mathematics that
supports a logical theory of identity in physics-friendly terms. This is an advantage of the new
axiomatic approach, which HoTT instantiates.
4. Higher-order identities and Objecthood
The application of HoTT described in the last Section has been used for demonstrating a
method; by itself this naive application obviously cannot have any theoretical significance. How-
ever a further feature of the identity concept in HoTT, which I describe in this Section probably
can.
Let us come back to MLTT. Given two terms x′,y′ of type IdT (x,y), i.e. two proofs of the
proposition saying that x and y are identical, one may form a further proposition saying that x′,y′
are the same proof, in symbols IdIdT (x,y)(x
′,y′). By reiterating this construction one obtains propo-
sitional types of order 3 and any higher order n. The “naturality” of the homotopical interpretation
of MLTT amounts to the fact that Homotopy theory models this hierarchy of identity types without
trivializing it. Let x′,y′ be paths with the same endpoints x,y. Under the homotopical interpretation
of MLTT these paths model proofs of identity IdT (x,y). Homotopy is a parametrized continuous
transformation of the form x′′ : x′ → y′, which transforms one given path into the other. Homo-
topy x′′ models proof of identity of paths x′,y′ written in symbols as IdIdT (x,y)(x
′,y′). This latter
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Figure 3: Gravitational lensing caused by a massive body
Figure 4: Gravitational lensing caused by a wormhole
identity is modeled by the space (understood up to the homotopy equivalence of the next order) of
homotopies of the form x′′. Parametrized continuous transformations of the form x′′′ : x′′→ y′′ are
homotopies of the next order, which model identities between homotopies of the previous order.
This construction extends to homotopies of any order n which model identities of homotopies of
the previous order n−1.
Let us now see what kind of natural physical interpretation can be given to higher iden-
tity/homotopy types. Consider the case of gravitational lensing produced by a massive object
situated between the observer O and the observed source S (Fig. 3). Our setting is now not the
Newtonian space and time but the space-time of Einstein’s General Relativity. However the situa-
tion is similar in this respect: once again we have two apparently different observable objects S′ and
S′′ and want to identify them as different images of the same object S. The method we have used
in the Venus case does not work here: there is no continuous path between S′,S′′. However there
exists homotopy h, which transforms path OS′ into path OS′′. Let me assume that the existence of
h is empirically testable. The positive outcome of such a test can be used as an empirical evidence
of identity S′ and S′′. In order to identify source S we apply here the second-order identity of the
form h : IdIdC(O,S)(OS
′,OS′′).
The space H of homotopies of the form h is topologically a disc. Thus H like the path space
from the Venus example is contractible, i.e., homotopy equivalent to a point. Thus we don’t get here
any unusual identity condition. However the situation is different when the gravitational lensing is
caused by a wormhole (Fig. 4). In this case paths OS′,OS′′ are no longer homotopical. In order to
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identify source S we shall apply the same trick at a higher dimension. Now paths OS′,OS′′ belong
to two different path spaces, namely two discs H ′,H ′′. These discs are homotopical (through a
homotopy of order 2), i.e., they are the “same” disc H in the sense of the identity of order 3. Let
d be a (second order) homotopy of the form t : H ′→ H ′′. The space T of homotopies of this form
is topologically a solid torus (not to be confused with the usual torus, which is its 2-dimensional
boundary). The solid torus is homotopy equivalent to a circle but not to a point. So we get here an
identity type, which is topologically non-trivial.
Even if the above examples can qualify only as toy examples they demonstrate how HoTT and
the new axiomatic approach, which HoTT instantiates, allows for combining logical and geometri-
cal methods in physics.
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